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- 1  -
Mon problème, ou la seule possibilité de travail 
théorique que je me sente, ça serait de laisser, 
selon les dessins les plus intelligibles possibles, 
les traces des mouvements par lesquels je ne 
suis plus à la place où j'étais tout-à-l'heure.
Collège de France, 30 January 1980
This paper will not to speculate upon the underlying intentions or 
motives behind Foucault's change from the 1970s to the 1980s. 
Instead, it goes back to the sources, especially the lectures he gave 
at the Collège de France , and elsewhere. ( 1 ) But it does not want 
merely to tell a story either. The limitations of space itself would 
forbid such an undertaking. Rather, the aim is to analyse these 
lectures, and Foucault's intellectual trajectory in general, in order 
to clarify a set of interrelated problems this change, or Foucault's 
last period, his work done between 1977 and 1984 poses; 
problems that were encountered in an attempt to use this body of 
work in concrete research.
The first problem is posed by the last two published books. It 
seems to me that it is hardly possible to make a proper sense of 
these two volumes, in light of the earlier work. It is, of course, 
possible to interpret them, to make hypotheses and conjectures, to 
put forward one's own interpretation. But without additional 
information, it is hopeless to bridge the gaps between the two 
books published in 1975-76 and in 1984. The term "meaning" 
refers here not to some deep, underlying, secret sense, but the 
difference something makes. And here, the personal doubts can be 
supported by the little difference these last books made so far. 
Though they became integral parts in some philosophical 
commentaries or works in Classical studies, have not been 
incorporated in concrete researches that use Foucault's work as a 
starting point.
This difficulty can be partly explained by the fact that the fourth 



























































































-  2 -
several problems would still be left open, especially concerning 
the link with both the present and his earlier work. Foucault 
realised that there is a problem here, at least since he was made 
aware of it by a conversation with Dreyfus and Rabinow in 1983. 
(2) He must have tried to increase clarity. But at that period his 
greatest preoccupation, preceding questions of reception, was to 
finish first of all the research itself, (3) and had little time after.
However, there were some other reasons that prevented Foucault, 
or even made it undesirable for him to strive for a full clarity, to 
facilitate an easiness of understanding. First, this would have 
meant a commentary on oneself, a prescription of the reading, a 
pursuit of the game he wanted to escape and analyse. Second, he 
was well aware of the problems of contemporary academic life, 
the way ideas, books, and thinkers are immediately packaged for 
easy use, and wanted to avoid this. (4) It is significant that up till 
today, the few lapses or allowances he made in his American 
lectures and interviews still define the way he is received there. 
(5) But the anticipated French audience effects also put special 
constraints on the final output. Foucault's silence, his alleged 
failure, exhaustion, dead end, was a recurrent theme of the period. 
Foucault faced an almost impossible situation in the early 1980s, 
was caught between two different and opposed concerns. On the 
one hand, he wanted to escape the previous expectations, the role, 
the grid, that, he felt, the French audience put upon him, and 
several times expressed the wish to publish anonymously, so that 
his ideas could be heard in their difference; on the other hand, he 
had to show the coherence and the consistency of his project, had 
to be faithful to his early choices, to convince that his work is not 
haphazard or subject to change according to the winds of time. 
The published books reflect both concerns, making them even 
more difficult to read. One only has to recall the Introduction to 
L'Usage des plaisirs , its density and circularity, its seemingly 
repetitive character, where each return to the previous topic only 
gives another twist to it, following, sometimes with extreme 



























































































-  3 -
The second problem is given by the concept of governmentality 
itself. Its importance has been immediately realised, and the 
lecture where Foucault mentioned it first has been published, 
reprinted, and used ever since. (6) But the lack of other available 
sources often makes one forget that this was just a first 
formulation. As soon as one tries to use the concept in concrete 
research, beyond settling with a vague idea a bout'a mentality to 
govern everything! immediately difficulties arise. These troubles 
are not solved even when the other lectures of the years 1978 
and 1979 are consulted. A number of facts show that the concept 
remained underdeveloped.
\
First, after the "Governmentality" lecture, Foucault several times 
shifted the meaning of the term and the respective periodisation. 
To give only a few indications, governmentality sometimes 
referred only to the modem period, the emergence of bio-power, 
since the 18th century; sometimes it went back to the 16th 
century, to the crisis of pastorate; and another times it was used 
as a general horizon of the study of political power in general. The 
troubles are multiplied if we consider that apart from the 
manifold uses of this term, Foucault employed a number of other 
notions, sometimes sinonymously, sometimes in a complementary 
way: governmental reason, governmental rationality, political 
rationality, and the art of government. (7) At this point, one could 
attempt to collect all the uses of the term together, and try to 
develop a "comprehensive definition", but this would be quite 
alien both to the word and spirit of Foucault, and would not lead 
very far anyway. But a joint consideration of such definitions does 
provide a useful intermediate product. It points out that the major 
difference between the formulations of governmentality and the 
earlier conceptualisations of power lies in a distance. Instead of 
the earlier denouncing style and the implications that subjectivity 
is being produced by power, the approach is more cautious: 
Foucault is rather posing the question of how it happened that the 
subject became implied in the exercise of political power. (8)
The point of this analysis is not to be "critical", to claim that the 



























































































-  4  -
It is rather the opposite: how this term could be made to function 
properly. Any conventional criticism would be improper anyway, 
) as Foucault never used this term in proper print. All occurrences 
of the word were related either to his lectures, the outlines of his 
lectures, or occasional references in interviews - but even there in 
the close context of his lectures, or his work in progress, (9) never 
once in a finished article or book. There are three important cases 
where the term is significantly omitted. First, in the two major last 
published essays, he did not use the term once. (10) Second, 
while the concept of governmentality and his related work is 
mentioned in a review of his own work published in the Collège 
de France outline in 1981, it is missing from the related final 
publications. (11) But the clearest confirmation of this point is 
that while in the Intended Preface, he was using the term, and 
emphatically, it was again left out from the final publication, and 
never once appeared in the last two published volumes. (12)
Yet, the most significant shift in the use of the concept concerns 
not the gap between the oral and written material, but the 
lectures themselves. It is well-known that after two years of 
lectures on governmentality, getting ever closer to the present, 
Foucault suddenly took a deep plunge back in history and away 
from the concept. But, even if the fact is well-known, it has not so 
far been taken properly into account, though the exact 
circumstances should be analysed fully before one can opt for the 
use of the concept, and with full efficiency.
Two arguments can be posed that Foucault discarded the concept. 
The first, trivial argument could claim that he abandoned it 
because of the conceptual difficulties. The second would be a point 
analogous to the one Hennis made about Weber: no matter how 
long had he lived, Weber would have never come up with a 
theory of state, as it was not his problem. (13) The same may 
hold true for Foucault: the history of governmentality was 
proposed as an alternative to the theories of the state; but once 
Foucault realised that this was not his problem, he turned 
elsewhere. But, no matter how plausible they are, one fact falsifies 



























































































-  5 -
(14) Instead of abandoning completely the word, by some 
reasons he put it rather in parentheses.
One could explain such a thing in general terms. A thinker may 
simply save a concept, a formulation, an example, until it is 
properly digested, the perfect formula or the proper place for it is 
found. It would be a mistake to argue that anything that remained 
unpublished at the death of a writer was effectively discarded. 
Foucault's work does give a number of related examples - let's 
just refer to his analysis of Alcibiades that was the starting point 
for the 1982 lectures in the Collège de France and elsewhere, and 
yet is hardly at all mentioned eventually in print. But in this case, 
such an explanation would not be sufficient in itself. As the 
abandonment of the concept of governmentality coincides with 
another major reorganisation in Foucault's work: the giving up of 
the study of power in general.
This happened in two steps, in the 1980 and 1981 lectures, 
presented by the highly theatrical arrangement of the first 
courses of the respective years. Here, only a very short analysis 
can be provided. The first lecture of 1980 starts with a detailed 
account of a story about the Roman emperor Septimus Severus, 
though last year, Foucault analysed German and American neo­
liberalism, and for this year, he promised - again - the study of 
bio-power. (15) After a return to the story of Oedipus, already 
discussed nine years before, he drew the methodological 
conclusions, by way of a double reorganisation: explicitly, he 
displaced the former central concept of power/ knowledge in 
favour of the expression "government by truth"; (16) and 
implicitly, therefore, redefined the link between government by 
truth and governmental rationality, or governmentality: while in 
the last lecture of 1979, it was the latter which enveloped the 
former, this time, the relation was reversed.
There is a clear break between the 1970s and 1980, but it is only 
an intermediate step. The central concept of 1980 is still 
connected to the study of power, containing the word 



























































































-  6 -
of 1980 gives five names to illustrate "government by truth": 
Botero, Quesnay, Saint-Simon, Rosa Luxemburg, and Solzhenitsyn. 
This is a tellin list: the contemporary problem, the present whose 
history Foucault is attempting to tell here is the links or hidden 
affinities between politics and economics, liberalism and socialism.
The following year, in the first lecture of 1981, there is no more 
talk about power or government, no allusion to problems of 
contemporary political thought, and no more gap between the title 
and the topic. Foucault announces the study of the links between 
truth and subjectivity, and not government and truth; specifies his 
approach to this issue, as different from both traditional 
philosophy and positivism; and states that his whole work has 
always been concerned with this question. He marks the break 
with the former work again in a theatrical manner. He starts the 
first lecture with the way the story of the elephants' marital 
habits were used as tales of moral conduct in different periods, 
and after giving two examples from the 17th-18th centuries, 
indicating this time a continuity, not a break, runs backwards 
through centuries, settling only in Antiquity, now for good. In the 
lecture given in the US at the end of the year, published as the 
first essay of the Afterword to the Dreyfus-Rabinow book, 
Foucault makes the same point, only even more bluntly: power is 
not his problem, and has never been so, even if his work got 
mingled with this question.
This claim is not something that should be taken lightly. It makes 
necessary to re-pose an old question, which is the consistency or 
the coherence of Foucault's work. Foucault's comments about his 
refusal to fit into the brackets or expectations of the others, or the 
results of his own past work, are well known. But this makes the 
the question of internal consistency all the more important. There 
is a difference between continuous innovation and haphazardness. 
And there are many facts showing that the consistency of his 
work has become a central preoccupation of the late Foucault. 
Thus, the abandonment of the concept of governmentality, the 
disclaimer about power, and the internal coherence of the work 
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sense of the last turn of Foucault, to assess its proper difference, 
especially from the perspective of this paper, which is concerned 
with the question of how to use his work best in concrete 
research. Now, again, several remarks of Foucault could be quoted 
to disqualify the very point of such an undertaking. But there is 
no question here of setting up a rule for others. Also, on several 
occasions, Foucault also stated that one should not write upon, or 
objectify, the thinkers one is using in one's own work. (17) But to 
say that therefore any discussion of questions of method related 
to the application of Foucault's work is pointless would be simply 
to deny the reality of a problem. As such a problem does exists. If 
it is generally acknowledged that Foucault's work is difficult to 
understand, requires a lot of efforts, then it is all the more so for 
any attempts to use his work in actual research. And this problem 
is not restricted to the most obvious point that a large part of the 
late work has remained unpublished, therefore its eventual use 
requires careful works of reconstruction.
Given that Foucault's whole work aimed at getting beyond the 
objectifying and subjectifying sciences, even if only in the sense of 
trying to set their limits and not disqualifying them, their 
methods obviously cannot be taken over directly. Nevertheless, 
there are obvious, promising advantages in the way these 
discourses build up their own momentum. The objective sciences 
can generate a cumulative growth of research findings, while the 
subject-centred discourses can always lean back to the work of 
the founder of the discourse, find a common source of inspiration, 
and can continue his work. It is clear that none of these could or 
should be followed in the case of Foucault. Yet, the complete 
discarding of considerations of cumulativity and continuity has 
the disadvantage that in this way, the eventual effect produced 
will be small, though such an effect is the aim of any work. 
Foucault is not alone here, but shares the fate of some of the most 
inspiring minds of our age, who could be compared to Foucault on 
matter of substance, method, style, and reception: Nietzsche, 
Weber, Elias, and Aries. They all opted for independent and lonely 
work, refused the establishment of a personal school of disciples, 



























































































-  8 -
being continued, or being continuously and systematically 
misinterpreted, used well under its potential. (18) This poses a 
question: would it be possible to make use of the advantages of 
the cumulativity of research findings, and the continuation of 
previous personal works, without following the approach of the 
objectifying and subjectifying sciences, that, from the perspective 
of the questions studied by these thinkers, would represent 
fallacies? Or, is there no other way but the choice between the 
following three options: take for granted one's own subjective 
opinion, by giving up the possibility to question and transform 
one's own perspective; select a master, and join a school of 
followers who can continue the same work but unable to move 
beyond; or follow the logic of the positive sciences, and refuse any 
consideration of subjectivity?
Let us start the attempt to move beyond these three options on 
two separate tracks. The main methodological query posed to the 
objective sciences, according to Weber who follows here Nietzsche, 
is the neglect of perspective. Research tools or concepts should be 
taken over only if attention is paid to the perspective of their use. 
Now, much of the scholastic debate about the importance of 
perspective could be spared if we substitute this term with the 
word "problem". This would help to clarify a difference between 
different fields of knowledge: practical matters of problem­
solving, where the definition of the problem as given in daily life 
can be taken for granted by those who work on the solution; 
disciplinary research, where it is the internal development of a 
discipline that poses such questions, that again can be taken as 
given for the researcher; and the cases of reflexive, or self- 
reflexive, problems, where the problem itself cannot be taken as 
given, but becomes a problem itself. The dependence of methods 
or concepts on perspective is pertinent, under normal 
circumstances, only to the last case. The question of the 
perspective therefore leads to the question of the original problem 
instigating a self-reflexive project.
Concerning the subjective approach, the dilemma of the master- 



























































































-  9 -
thinkers are used as reference points for thinking. The aim is not 
to continue the work of one thinker, but of a set of thinkers. This 
would seem nothing more but the reproduction of the 
establishment of a new discipline. But, combined with the 
previous result, it may also involve something quite different. The 
purpose is not to search for the common ideas, the similar 
concepts, in order to integrate the answers, which would usually 
lead only to the reduction of their specificity to the smallest 
common denominator; (19) but to establish the common points at 
the level of the questions themselves. This leads to the project of 
the reconstruction of the common problematics underlying the 
work of different thinkers; a project that would enjoy advantages 
of relying upon the cumulativity of findings without neglecting 
the question of perspective; and that could continue established 
paths of thought without being threatened by mere repetitiveness 
or the urge to move always "beyond". (19b)
Reconstructing Foucault's problematics
But in this paper, let us restrict the attention to Foucault. 
Fortunately, at this point Foucault, generally so silent about his 
work and its possible uses, does also give some help. As one of his 
most recurrent preoccupation in the late 1970s and the early 
1980s was exactly the attempt to define "his problem". So far, 
these attempts have not received much attention, perhaps due to 
the widespread view that a person should be the last to be trusted 
about the assessment of his own work; or that such assessments 
are nothing more than accidental, leisurely overviews, based on 
simple recollections. However, in Foucault's case, the matter is 
completely different. First, he is not trying to explain or justify his 
works. He is not talking upon his purpose or the underlying 
meaning, only about his problem. This was what caused him 
trouble at that time, and not the justification of the correctness of 
his theories - something that for most researchers never created a 
headache. (20) And second, for Foucault, such reflections did not 
represent a mere pastime, but a work itself, work done on his own 



























































































-  10  -
basis of a categorisation of his former work. The question is not 
what could have been their common goal, purpose, or motive, but 
what could have been the common problem each of them 
addressed, even if in different manners.
It is true that on several occasions, Foucault have already 
specified his problem earlier. (21) But during the years 1976 to 
1980, exactly in the period of his crisis and reorganisation, such 
attempts have become very frequent, and led to continuously 
shifting results. With some exaggeration one could say that this 
was a returning topic in almost every lecture he gave at the 
Collège de France and elsewhere, a focal point in every interview. 
From around 1981, both the preoccupation becomes less urgent, 
and the results stable. What does all this mean: what difference 
does it make for us, and what did it produce for Foucault?
In these years, Foucault was trying to come to terms with his new 
project, to find its new focus and equilibrium. The two problems, 
the accomplishment of his current research, and the specification 
of his own problem, were simultaneous: he needed to specify his 
own problem in order to be able to solve the problems of his 
research; but he also needed to finish his new research, or at least 
produce some work, in order to find a proper occasion and frame 
for such self-reflections. This knot was dissolved only in 1980, 
when, after giving the lectures, he was able to produce the first 
manuscript version of Les Aveux de la chair. In its Introduction, 
which has been published, with some modifications, (22) Foucault 
presented finally a definition of his problem, and a categorisation 
of his whole former work that has remained stable, and was 
repeated, with minimal changes, up to the last interview and 
publications of 1984. According to this, Foucault's problem has 
! always centred upon the question of the links between the subject 
and truth, but in the different periods, he studied this problem in 
different topics: in scientific discourses, in dividing up practices,




























































































- 1 1  -
But this is only part of the story. Not only because given these 
preliminary findings, one should now go back to the work itself, 
and analyse whether such an assessment was correct. But because 
the finding of this problem for Foucault was a work on his own 
previous work; and the aim of such a work, like of all work, was 
not simply to define a truth, but to produce an effect. And, in fact, 
these reflections did not cease to produce effects for Foucault, in 
the sense of modifying the work itself. The first instance is the 
discovery of the concept of governmentality itself. The conditions 
of emergence of a concept may be in most cases only a matter of 
trivial detail. In this case, however, they provide a good 
illustration and a strong support for a methodological point. The 
governmentality lecture was the fourth lecture given in 1978. At 
the end of the preceding, third lecture, Foucault said something he 
did not do for almost a decade. He returned, for the first time 
since the late 1960s, on a positive note, to some of the findings of 
the Order o f Things . But in a similar way, the effect of the review 
of the work can be seen in the way Foucault returned in 1981, 
after the Summer 1980 review of his works, to the study of 
sexuality in 1981, finally feeling himself ready to finish the 
project. But the most important effect of the work on his own 
problem was no doubt the new directions of the last years, 
beyond the topic of sexuality.
Reconstructing the intellectual trajectory'
Before going into the details, however, let's first use these results 
and return to a short analysis of Foucault's encounter with power, 
as this is quite a crucial question for the perspective of this paper 
the links between governmentality and the last Foucault, and 
their use for concrete research. If we do accept that Foucault's 
problem has always been the question of subjectivity and truth, 
then the relation between Foucault's problematics and his work on 
power must be clarified. In 1981, he explicitly and categorically 
stated that power was not his problem, in front of an audience 
that wanted to hear his views on power; but earlier in the 1970s, 



























































































-  12 -
sense of this contradiction, without invalidating the findings of the 
reconstruction of his problematics, and preserving the needed 
consistency of Foucault's work?
In order to answer these questions, another major reconstructive 
analysis would be necessary, this time of Foucault's whole 
intellectual trajectory. Here only the first steps of such an analysis 
can be indicated. As a starting point, a new term has to be 
introduced, Nietzsche's concept of the "will to knowledge". (25) 
There are two difficulties with this concept. The first is that 
Foucault did use this concept several times, together with the 
related concept of the will to truth, but this presents a rare and 
intriguing case of confusion in Foucault's thought. He several times 
promised and failed to distinguish between the two concepts, then 
left them altogether, together with the development of the term 
power/ knowledge; and finally returned to the will to knowledge 
in 1976, as a subtitle, claimed to be a tribute to Nietzsche, but 
using the term again not in the proper Nietzschean sense. (26) 
The second problem is that the original Nietzschean term is very 
closely associated to the concept of the will to power, therefore it 
is extremely difficult to give a short definition. Provisionally, as a 
shorthand, the will to knowledge stands for the pursuit of a kind 
of research where one is not following simply one's interests, 
curiosities, a conscious purpose, or an externally given goal, but 
starting from personal experiences pursues a line of investigation 
over which nevertheless maintains an organising control. To give 
an illustration, the usual model of academic research is that a 
student picks up a theme that raises his/ her curiosity. This is a 
completely "subjective" matter, not explained or dealt with. Then, 
in order to approach this question, one follows the professional 
procedures and methods given by the respective discipline. In the 
case of the will to knowledge , it is this organising control in terms 
of choices of method and reference points that is maintained and 
not ceded to the different disciplines; instead of subordinating 
research to their control, the researcher is using them as tools. 
This term can be compared to the concept of autonomy, with the 



























































































-  13 -
thewill to knowledge cannot be rendered intelligible in the legal 
terminology of intentions and rights.
On the basis of this concept, let's give now a very short overview 
of Foucault's intellectual trajectory. All available biographical 
material affirms that at least since the early 1950s, Foucault 
pursued his own, personal line of research, with extraordinary 
zeal, discipline, and independence. Apart from the early book on 
mental illness that he wrote on request and before encountering 
Nietzsche, he finished his projects solely on his own, without 
paying attention to disciplinary-professional requirements, or 
possible reception. (27) The first deviation came about in the mid 
1960s. When he was finishing the Order o f Things , the 
structuralist "movement" started to break out. With it, Foucault 
suddenly must have felt the possibility of finding company, after 
so many years of lonely work, as he finished his book on some 
strong structuralist notes that were missing from his earlier 
works. (28) This modification did not fail to produce the due 
results: Foucault suddenly found a resounding success and a 
company. (29) For a short time, he accepts being a structuralist, 
even the guru of structuralism. But this happy feeling is soon 
followed by a hangover. He realises the manifold problems of this 
new allegiance. (30) This takes again a lot of time - let's not 
forget that the issue is a major existential transformation, and the 
external conditions both of his life and the world in general were 
quite peculiar at the time. But, finally, around 1971, he assesses 
the situation that he went completely astray in the whole of the 
1960s, with his literary writings. The conclusion he drew was that 
he could no longer trust his own will to knowledge. He gave up 
control over his work, though not by returning to the academic 
disciplines, but to those engaged in actual struggles. (31)
The effective result is a sudden and complete reorientation of his 
work. He started to study a new topic, never mentioned before: 
social control. This was a theme not related to personal 
experiences, the only such topic ever encountered by Foucault. 
(32) It even led to the partial re-shaping of his whole personality: 



























































































-  14  -
Foucault, that he never believed in this figure. (33) And instead 
of following his own approach, he relied upon a peculiar 
combination of Nietzsche and Marx that had unfortunately close 
links with the approach of critical theory. The choice was quite 
clear, intelligible, and again following the advice of Nietzsche: not 
being strong enough to pursue his own will to power - in this case, 
a personal research - to the end, he should serve others. In this 
sense, there was even a peculiar connection between the topic and 
his personal experience: Foucault studied social disciplining 
exactly at the moment when he felt that he needed to discipline 
himself, and it was the topic of disciplining that provided occasion 
for his self-disciplining. These curious cross-references no doubt 
helped to introduce some ambiguities in a work that wanted to be 
all so evident, and made it possible to be re-interpreted on the 
basis of the late work.
When he finished the book in the mid-1970s, it was not only the 
prison movement and the atmosphere of 1968 that was over, but 
Foucault was also ready to escape the cage he made for himself. In 
fact, his work in the 1970s is nothing but a series of changes, of 
displacements, not simply in the well-known sense of the 
continuous innovation, but also getting more and more back to his 
own approach, or his own "problem''. (34) With every new step, 
his thinks the ordeal is over, and yet, soon realises that needs to 
make another one. The publication of the two books, the six- 
volume sexuality project, the lectures on war, the concepts of bio­
power, population, mechanisms of security, and finally 
governmentality are all instances of the same continuous 
displacement, not simply away from the previous ideas, but also 
asymptotically back to his "own problem". Retrospectively, we can 
assess that the crucial break came with governmentality. It was 
1 this concept that led him back directly to the study of subjectivity. 
But, nevertheless, even with this concept, he could not break 
completely free from the remaining hold of the style and content 
of the work of the 1970s. This work started with a break, and had 
to be closed, counterbalanced with a similar break; the series of 
continuous displacements were not sufficient. And this he must 



























































































-  15 -
lectures and the first talks with Dreyfus and Rabinow, and finally 
consumed in Summer 1980 - as the new break is effectively 
there. (35) He had to escape completely from the whole affair of 
the 1970s and power, in order to think again on his own.
Reconstructing the lectures of the 1980s
With these considerations in mind, after the reconstruction of 
Foucault's problematics and his intellectual trajectory, we can get 
a better understanding of the content and the stakes of the 
lectures Foucault gave in the 1980s. Let's start with a few general 
points. First, even if, on the basis of the record of publications, 
between 1976 and 1984 Foucault was working on the history of 
sexuality project, in fact, he only lectured for one year on this 
topic, in 1981 - even if he stated several times that he considered 
that the Collège de France lectures at once presented a good 
occasion and prescribed a duty to present his actual researches. 
(36) Besides lecturing on governmentality in 1978-79, he 
lectured on the techniques of self (in 1982, and basically even in 
1980), and on parrhesia or truth-telling (1983-84). In sum, the 
two published volumes on sexuality represent merely 2/3 of the 
1/4 of Foucault's work done in the last 8 years! Second, even if he 
arranged some material for publication, while other lectures have 
been published by others, and he tried to include references to 
the other topics of his lectures in the two published volumes, 
these do not even give a sufficient glimpse into the material 
covered in the lectures. The case is rather the opposite: it is only 
once the lectures are read that the significance of these comments 
can be realised. (37)
Having said all this, it would be a denial of the points of this paper 
if in the remaining few pages, it would shortly sum up the "basic 
points" of these lectures. Instead, only one analysis will be done: 
the showing of how, on the basis of the reconstruction of his own 
problem, or the return to it, Foucault draw his points in the 1980s 
beyond the question of truth and subjectivity. We have already 



























































































-  16  -
Foucault turned out to be a major, or perhaps the major, operator 
of the last period of his work. Once Foucault found his 
problematics, he was able to do three things. First, to could return 
back to the history of sexuality project, in order to finish it. But at 
this point, he encountered new difficulties. The first was of a 
methodological character: he had to come to terms with the 
analysis of a problem of continuity, while his archaeological 
methods were originally developed for problems of discontinuity. 
To this methodological problem, he found solution in the 
development of the concept of "problématisation". But the second 
was substantive. Due to the abandonment of his project in the 
1970s, he needed to retrieve it now, and found it with success. But 
now, he faced the problem that in order to be able to finish his 
work, he had to drive his points further, to work along and 
further on, beyond the question of subjectivity and truth, as this 
latter no longer remained a hidden problem, but became 
conscious. Therefore, he had to move further, to raise and sustain 
again his interest, in order to be able to finish even the former 
sexuality project. With this, we arrive at the second major impact 
of the reconstruction of his problem: the possibility to continue his 
work in the direction instigated by, but not limited to, the 
question of the links between truth and subjectivity. This led him 
to the discovery of the concepts of "techniques" or "practices" of 
self. (38) Finally, the third effect was that once he found his 
problem, he was able to situate his own work within a broader 
horizon, along the work of others.
Partly, this is given by the well-known references to the history 
of the problem of Enlightenment as the major problem of modem 
philosophy, going back to Kant, and the recurrent presentation of 
his own tradition, which, however, is not without problems, due to 
anticipated audience effects. (39) But much more important than 
this situating among the work of others was that in this way, it 
became possible to situate the problem of Foucault on a broader 
horizon. This is the point at which, on the basis of Foucault's own 
self-reconstruction, this paper will go beyond what has been 
written down by Foucault. Because, at the end, his work did reach 
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dissolution of order. This is the fact that, for e.g., made possible 
the problématisation of practices Foucault wrote about in two 
published volumes.
The point is the following. It is obvious that the problem of order, 
peace, and tranquillity is at the centre of thinking since the 
earliest times, whether in the form of religion, myths, rituals, or 
laws. But this kind of thinking in general has two major models in 
mind, reflecting two major problems: the problem of military 
threat or conquest, or the problem of the creation and 
maintenance of order, the codification and fortification of rules, 
customs, laws. In other words, behind them, we find the two 
major, traditional models, or discourses, of power: that of the 
"War" and of the "Law". Critical discourse, as the lectures of 1976 
partially reconstruct, is based since the beginning upon the 
counterposition of conquest and repression; while the mainstream, 
legal model, since the same period, and most often not in 
opposition but in close contact with the critical model, tries to 
answer the problem of how to create, maintain, preserve order. 
These are the two major aims of sovereign power in the feudal 
period, for e.g., and are well summarised in the titles of the two 
major novels of the 19th century, that were significantly Russian: 
War and Peace, and Crime and Punishment. (40)
However, what Foucault has discovered, or at least what he gave 
access to at the end of his work is a completely different kind of 
problem; a problem that, no matter how obvious it looks, has been 
shadowed so far by the other two problems, has been reduced to 
them, to their discourse. This is the case when the established 
order of things collapses internally, not caused either by external 
conquest, or a victory of the "marginal" forces of crime, sin, and 
disorder. It is this problem that establishes common points 
between such different historical periods as the 16th century 
Europe, the first and last days of the Roman Empire, or the crisis 
of Greek civilisation in the 7-6th centuries. Modernity can be 
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If we meet this problem in its positivity, and separate it from the 
accounts that are given using the language of the other two 
problems, of law or repression, then a crucial thing can be 
perceived: this is a problem that unavoidably involves reflexivitv. 
This is obviously not so for case of conquest: it only reinforces 
what was so far the trivial, makes it into a value, a goal. The 
discourse of law neither involves reflexivity necessarily and 
directly. In this case, all that matters is the proper formulation 
and specification, but the basic principles are ready-made. 
However, in the particular case of the dissolution of the order, the 
problem is exactly that the former ways and manners have lost all 
relevance, in their entirety. There is nothing "old" to rely upon. No 
solution is given, everything has to be invented. It is order, or the 
belief in order itself which has to be restored, from the scratch. 
And it can easily be seen that this is a problem that is impossible 
to solve in the traditional way, as first the conditions in which a 
solution could be possible have to be created.
One can illustrate this problem by making a distinction between 
tyranny and despotism. This at the same time illustrates the point 
how, in spite of its difference, this problem is usually subsumed 
under the traditional models, or discourses, and the problems it 
creates. For the first, one can refer to the work of Foucault on 
Oedipus; for the second, on the book of Wittfogel. Now, in common 
language, and unfortunately in most political theory, the two 
things are mixed together. Yet, both the underlying problem and 
their emergence is quite different. Tyranny is an attempt to solve, 
always and by definition unsuccessfully, but never without 
consequences, the problem of disorder - a good example is 
modern absolutism. It wants to restore, single-handedly, and 
outside the law that has become useless, order. Despotism has a 
quite different logic and dynamics: it results exactly where the 
order of things has not been broken, but became ever stronger 
and more compact There is at the heart of Oriental despotism, and 
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In this way, by specifying the problem of the internal dissolution 
of order, a new kind of history was discovered, behind the 
histories of wars and conquests, and of crimes and legislation.
This new type of history has its special characteristics. The most 
crucial is that such a history cannot be but reflexive. The 
dissolution of order is an event that nobody can escape; and an 
event that has no internal, in-built, natural solution. The only 
"natural" solution would be a return to the previous order, but 
this is by definition impossible, as it is exactly its dissolution that 
is the problem. The result is an increased self-awareness, 
necessary reflexive activity. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
such periods, whether in Greece, Rome, or modern Europe, are 
accompanied by outbursts of philosophising. In fact, it was this 
problem and this period that gave birth to philosophy in Greece - 
with its centre, not surprisingly, being the order of the world.
But this is only part of the story. It would only give us an 
explanation for the birth of philosophy. However, the implications 
of this problem are much broader. The point is that the problem 
itself involves reflexivity. It is here that the true novelty of the 
situation lies: reflexivity emerges, enters the stage as any other 
activity of thinking, in the sense of problem-solving. The problem 
of order that the first Greek philosophers tried to solve was not 
simply a matter for philosophers, but was a matter of life and 
death in the "real world" as well.
All this does not mean that therefore philosophy directly entered 
political and social life. (41) Quite the contrary: the solutions of 
philosophers and statesmen were always different, and for 
obvious reasons: for the latter, the actual, surviving forces of the 
dissolving order always had to be taken directly into account. The 
key point is that from the perspective of this problem, there was 
no gap between real solutions and "mere" reflexive thought. Even 
if the solutions of statesmen and philosophers were different, they 
were of the same kind: they were not "material", but reflexive. 
(42) At this point, due to this problem, and here only, the history 
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potentially inseparable. Throughout history, the earlier thoughts 
have later become used and deployed in actual problem-solving 
situations. This gives a very specific time-gap between abstract 
thought and history, and of the opposite kind as the one the can 
be characterised by Hegel: reflexive thought in this case does not 
come after history, but before; reflexive problems in reality are 
solved on the basis of earlier developments in thought, as 
problems of a reflexive kind are "problematised” on the basis of 
the available theoretical tools.
Foucault has never spoken of the problem of the dissolution of 
order in such terms. But it is only a very small step from his last 
writings, and is in the line of his own self-reflections. And it does 
help to clarify a large number of points with respect to his work - 
and not only the last period.
First, it helps finally to situate the question and the place of 
"thought" within Foucault’s work. This word had a central place at 
crucial times. (43) But, also, this was used as a pretence for 
charges of idealism, whether on the part of those who were hostile 
to Foucault in general, or who tried to use only his ideas on power 
and the body, in order to make him "more materialist than the 
materialists themselves". But the reconstruction of Foucault's 
problematics does not leave room for such an interpretation. The 
question of the body is only an aside in Foucault's work, an 
instance of the way thought and reflexivity became a factor in 
reality; a proof that even the body cannot be taken as a stable 
reference point, outside thought. The problem of the dissolution of 
order dissolves the problem of idealism and materialism: if the 
real solution requires the work of reflexive thought, it is 
meaningless to make a charge of idealism - emphatically, to the 
extent of the validity of this specific case.
Second, in this way, the emphasis from thought as discourse (the 
level of answers) shifts to thought as problematisation (the level 
of questions). It was in this way that Foucault was able to solve 
the methodological difficulties encountered in the last period. It 
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his analyses with the presentation of a radical break between 
modern and earlier practices - let's just think of the contrasting 
cases of the public execution and the time-table for young 
prisoners at the beginning of Discipline and Punish , or the two 
different treatments with which the Birth o f the Clinic started. 
The break being given, Foucault only had to reconstruct the 
different rationalities or rituals separately. However, in the new 
works, he encountered the opposite problem, that of continuity. 
Here, he had to discover the starting point, the break. This 
problem can be illustrated by the tale of the elephant mentioned 
earlier, or the thematic continuity between Plato's Apology and a 
work on virginity by Gregory of Nyssa, mentioned at the 
beginning of the 1982 lectures. (44) This not only meant that he 
had to find the historical period with which he had to start the 
analysis, but also that he had to conceptualise in proper terms the 
role of thought in the new situation. Concerning the first, we know 
now what were the subsequent shifts in Foucault's time horizon: 
first, back to the 16th century (1978), then 3-4th centuries AD 
(1980), l-2nd centuries AD (1981-2), and finally, 4-5th BC (1983- 
84). In other words, he went back in history exactly to the periods 
of dissolution of order. Concerning the second, and simultaneously 
with this historical retrocession, Foucault developed the concept of 
problematisation . When encountering a problem of continuity, he 
had to go back in time until discovered the original 
problematisation underlying the different solutions. This is in a 
sense a return to the original Nietzschean concept of genealogy, 
with its emphasis on the conditions of emergence; (45) but also a 
return to archaeology.
Foucault's last period can be called the second archaeological 
period, and its central category is problematisation , and not the 
games of truth. In the first archaeological period, the key concept 
was discourse . As it is well known, that was an attack on theory 
and the object-subject relations underlying it. A discourse is not 
the adequate or ideological representation of an underlying 
reality, but a specific answer, depending on the available tools, or 
stocks of discourse. But all this still moved at the level of answers, 
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not able to conceptualise change, put it rather in brackets. It is at 
this point that the second archaeology moves beyond the failures 
and omissions of the first. It conceptualises the way the question 
itself is posed, and thus explains the change to the extent that it is 
at all possible, by reconstructing the problematisation. And as all 
this is related to problems that are inherently reflexive, the 
danger of the illusion of autonomous discourse is not even posed. 
Discourse may not be autonomous, but a problematisation is, 
especially when the problem itself is reflexive.
Third, in this way we can revisit Foucault's famous claim about 
cutting down the head of the king in political discourse. The point 
is that the dissolution of order as a problem on its own did not 
even appear at the level of political discourse, being reduced to 
the language of morality or law: the prophecy of apocalypse, or 
the attempt to provide new laws. But the problem is quite 
different, concerns the creation of an order in reality as a the 
condition of possibility of legislation. This is the reason why 
liberalism, with its exclusively legal thinking, could not even 
grasp, beyond any justification, absolutism. Liberalism fails to 
understand the reality of the problem to which absolutism was 
the answer, and can't see the way the possibility of a liberal 
solution was laid down by the very reality of absolutism. Though 
absolutism and the monarchy were intertwined and associated 
with other, the disappearance of the king by no means eliminated 
all effects of absolutism. (45b)
Fourth, this also helped Foucault to situate the thematic of 
subjectivity and truth. It is true that in the last books, due to a 
number of reasons, he returned to the old topic of sexuality, and 
he kept placing the questions of truth and subjectivity at the 
centre of his work. But in the lectures of the last years, he carried 
forward his new project that obviously was of much more interest 
to him than the accomplishment of the sexuality books. (46) Even 
the central terms of his work shifted from subjectivity and truth: 
instead of subjectivity, he talked rather about the self (practices 
and techniques of the self), and in 1982, he spent a whole course 
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subordinated to specific concerns related to the concern with the 
self. Doing so, he gained a perspective on the question on the 
relation between truth and reflexivity.
in modernity, the two are related as a matter of evidence: we 
reflect upon ourselves in order to perceive and realise our true 
being. In the whole process, the idea is that we should discover 
objectively who we are, independently of our will, and, of course, 
our activity of the search. However, this link is not at all obvious. 
The Greeks and Romans also did reflect upon their own activity 
and self, without trying to discover their own inner truth. At this 
point, one could say, together with several interpreters, that all 
this is simply a matter of "difference". But this is not the major 
point. It is rather that since Christianity, we are using exactly the 
same methods to discover our true selves that the Greeks and the 
Romans were using to transform their being.
This peculiar twist no doubts helps to make sense of a number of 
curious facts of modernity: the constant attempts of self­
reflection, both at the level of individual and society, and the 
recurrent, blatant failures; (47) the question of the lasting hold of 
the conditions of emergence, even if the conscious aim is different; 
and the question of self-reflexivity beyond the discovery of the 
self: whether, by reflecting not upon our true being, but on the 
techniques that are used for such reflection themselves, it is 
possible to gain control over them, and use in a different manner.
Fifth, it is also at that level that we encounter, in a brand new 
light, an old acquaintance, the concept of discipline or ascesis. 
From the distance of the work done up till 1982, Foucault - and 
we - can look back on the concept of "disciplining" and 
"disciplinary society" in a new light, without the style, the 
denunciations, the one-sidedness of the earlier book, but without 
discarding the work it contains. The best way to illustrate this 
point is by evoking a few ideas from the 1982 course, with 
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According to Foucault, up till Descartes spirituality, the work upon 
oneself, was considered to be a crucial precondition of the access 
to knowledge, to the status of a subject of knowledge. With 
Descartes, it has ceased to be so. This is a development that is 
analogous to the cases of Machiavelli and Adam Smith: the 
overthrow, from the inside, of a major tradition of thought; the 
last use of a given genre in order to make its further use 
impossible, to finish with it forever. Just as earlier, Machiavelli 
killed the mirror-of-princes literature, and the whole of 
traditional political thinking, and later, Adam Smith cancelled out 
moral philosophy from matters of economics, Descartes finished 
with meditation and spirituality as the precondition of philosophy. 
Taken together, these three steps led to the elimination of all 
references to spirituality from three major branches of 
philosophy: politics, epistemology, and ethics; in order to make 
exclusive way to professional knowledge, in each of these areas, at 
the price of denying the real effects of reflexivity and the 
necessary circularity these effects involve. It is only with paying 
due attention to the starting point, the "moving force" of thinking, 
the loss of familiarity, of the taken for granted; in one word, the 
emergence of the "gap”, that this "price" was again noticed by 
some of the most inquisitive minds of our period, that philosophy 
and thinking again became possible, outside the closed and fairly 
restricted circle of professionality. (49)
However, between the three, there is a big difference: Machiavelli 
was more of the sign of the crisis as the solution. He is obviously 
not a modern thinker while, even if within certain limits, 
Descartes and Adam Smith both are: they are still considered 
major, living reference points, and in this sense, constitute breaks 
that are or were considered up to our very days. (50) And they 
both pose a problem, at the level of thought: can we accept that 
this is a mere issue of "sudden discovery" and "realisation" of the 
truth; or can we point out something "behind", that made them 
possible?
Opting for the second point does not necessarily mean that one 
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"real historical events" caused these changes, giving external 
periodicity to thought. The answer lies rather in the specific 
historicity of thought, with its manifold but specific contacts to 
social history; and in our specific case, the major condition of 
possibility should be searched for exactly in the spread of the 
techniques of self. Spiritual meditation, in the form of establishing 
a break with one's past and surroundings, was necessary in order 
to gain true knowledge before; knowledge different from 
familiarity. But once the methods of disciplining were spread, once 
education and military service did provide, in the form of a 
specific hierarchical and spatial arrangement, and the imposition 
of an external discipline before the proper development of an 
ability of reflective reasoning, making these partitions and breaks 
a "second inner nature" to practically everyone to whom the 
question of spiritual transformation could be posed, there was no 
longer any need for an additional, adult spiritual exercise. 
Descartes simply realised the fact that there is no longer need for 
the creation of a specific status for the "subject of knowledge", 
since, because of the general spread of these techniques, everyone 
who mattered around him was already shaped accordingly. In this 
way, the use of the techniques of self became superfluous in an 
adult age; and instead of mastering a certain coming to terms with 
oneself, the way they shaped at an early age the very form of 
subjectivity made it impossible to conduct a proper self-reflection. 
Because modem man is made with the help of these techniques, is 
a "subject of knowledge" since childhood, a philosopher without 
knowing it, he cannot get an access to the very mechanisms that 
formed his own being. This is the real point of the question of 
disciplinary society that is a valid diagnosis even beyond the last 
Foucault, and not any reference to external constraint, 
manipulation, closed space, or the body.
Sixth, all this helps to better situate the question of subjectivity. It 
is here that one of the crucial reasons of Foucault's discarding of 
the concept of governmentality can be located. As, almost 
immediately after the discovery of this concept, Foucault got 
involved with the issue of subjectivity, and in the seventh lecture 
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whole topic, and went back to the original theme of the early 
history of governmentality. In 1980, he turned back to 
subjectivity, but still, could not quite escape the earlier logic of 
power. As, no matter how obvious it seems, it was not completely 
clear in the earlier works of Foucault that the issue of subjectivity 
is irreducibly an issue of reflexivity. (51) Therefore, beyond the 
problem of the objectifying and subjectifying sciences, beyond the 
attempts to reduce human beings to objects or assign to them, 
even if with their own co-operation, a fixed identity, the course of 
reflexivity can never be taken for granted. It may be that 
reflexivity can be manipulated by the most subtle manners of 
control. But it always assumes that in the very act of reflexivity, 
something is not reflected upon properly. And whenever it is 
brought to light, control does not operate any more - it becomes 
either an external constraint, or a technical tool over which one 
has control.
Seventh, in a most paradoxical way, after abandoning 
governmentality, together with power, beginning from the 
lectures of 1980, in his last years, and beyond subjectivity and 
truth, Foucault returns to this concept, as it is best indicated in the 
form of the overall title of the lectures of his last two years, 
"Government of the self and others". Following Foucault, we can 
state that this was the answer, in the form of a the 
problematisation, to problem of the disappearance of order.
The answer the Greeks gave, as it is well-known, was the 
invention of politics itself. (52) But it left open a question: how to 
link individuals to this new order? And here, still the old methods 
of traditional genealogy were used: birth rights; the only 
difference between aristocracy and democracy being the way the 
circle of those involved has been drawn. The emerging gap 
between descent and education was still neglected, and this 
eventually caused the decline of democratic politics. But there was 
another suggestion, of new methods, about doing work upon 
oneself as a precondition of the government of others. This was 
the proper reflexive answer, the birth of modem philosophy. And 
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stock of reflexive answers, and was mobilised later in several 
occasions. It is this problématisation that underlines the formation 
of the self, the connections between the government of the self 
and others, beyond the questions of subjectivity and truth, up to 
our very days, even if in a very different form: the link between 
the private and the common interest, it is this tradition toward 
which the last Foucault had at once diagnostic and affirmative 
remarks. (53)
At this point, a number of new lines are opened up, both in terms 
of the review and the continuation of Foucault's work, that cannot 
be pursued in here. Let's just mention here two points. The first is 
that the Greeks had a word that stood for a great many different 
points: the constitution, citizenship, the distribution of offices, the 
"good" type of democracy, even the soul of the city: this was the 
word politeia . It is a second crucial and peculiar omission in 
Foucault that he never considered the full implications of this 
concept (though mentioning it often in the 1983 lectures), even if 
this is the term used by Plato as the title of his major work, this is 
the etymological root of such major modern terms as police, 
policy, and polity, and, in a way, in itself embodies the link 
between the government of the self and the others. It may even 
be risked to say that the real Greek invention in terms of politics 
was exactly the politeia , and not the modern connotations of the 
term "politics", that were partly even more ancient, (going back to 
Egypt and the middle-Eastern civilisations) partly much more 
recent (related to the concept of representation). (54) Whatever 
is in between, whatever can be specifically assigned to the Greeks 
- open public space, citizen rights, moral and civic duties -, where 
all embodied in this concept of politeia . (55) Second, something 
can be said about the curious term used by Nietzsche and Foucault 
for the definition of their method: genealogy. This is a term that 
itself invited misunderstanding and turns away attention: a word 
smelling obsolescence and idiosyncratic, antiquarian interest. 
Genealogy in the traditional sense is not simply the study of 
descent, of family lineage, but is the way in which before the 
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society. It is at once the representation of order, and the actual 
fitting of the individual into the order. As "family origin" in this 
sense embodied education; the important later distinction 
between acquired and in-born qualities were irrelevant for the 
world of "traditional" genealogies. It is this whole arrangement 
that has become questioned with the dissolution of order. This wa 
the problem that was tackled, first with respect to the entry into 
politics and then to education in general, in the new development 
in philosophy since Socrates and Plato. (56) The genealogy of 
Nietzsche and Foucault is the story of the effects of this reflexive 
inflexion, of the fitting of the individuals into a world without 
stable genealogies; of the emergence of ethics and subjectivity. As 
the term "Zarathustra" was used for the prophet of "beyond good 
and evil", genealogy is the discourse of the analysis of a world 
beyond (traditional) order. (57)
Notes
( 1 ) These lectures can be consulted in tape in Foucault Archives 
at the Bibliothèque de Saulchoir in Paris. As the 1983 and 1984 
lectures have only recently been made available, I did not yet 
have the time to study them properly. In general, I have to 
apologise in advance for the many references in this article that 
no doubt many will find tedious; especially as it is not yet 
properly completed. However, the topic of the paper made this 
unavoidable.
(2) 19 April 1983 conversation with Dreyfus and Rabinow. See 
Foucault Archives, D 250 (5), p.30.
(3) In a follow-up conversation, he complained that he feels 
something is still not clear in the book. See 26 April 1983 
conversation with Dreyfus and Rabinow, D 250 (9), p.22.
(4) See Lawrence D. Kritzman (ed), Politics, Philosophy, Culture 
(Routledge, London, 1988), pp. 52,
(5) See, for e.g., the remark made at the end of his 1983 
Berkeley lectures on the aesthetics of existence, the only piece of 
thought of his six extraordinaiy seminars given there that became 
widely circulated; or the similar point about "bodies and 
pleasures" at the end of the first volume of the History o f 
Sexuality, p.157.
(6) It has been recently reproduced in The Foucault Effect: 
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with Michel Foucault, ed. by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and 
Peter Miller (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).
(7) See Colin Gordon's Introduction to The Foucault Effect. I 
should mention here that this research in general owes a lot to the 
work of Colin Gordon which it tries to take up and continue.
(8) The best such indication is given in the published outline for 
the 1978 course: "Political govemmentality [is] the manner in 
which the conduct of an ensemble of individuals became 
implicated, in an ever more marked manner, in the exercise of 
sovereign power." See Michel Foucault, Résumé des courses, 1970- 
82 (Paris, Juillard, 1989), p.101.1 apologise for using my own 
translation.
(9) See, for e.g., 'The ethic of care for the self as a practice of 
freedom', in James Bemauer and David Rasmussen (eds), The Final 
Foucault (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1988).
(10) See the "What Is Enlightenment" essay in the Foucault 
Reader and the "Subject and Power” essay as the afterword to the 
book of Dreyfus and Rabinow. In the latter, on p.224., Foucault 
uses the word "governmentalised", but it is only the verbal form 
of government, and specifically refers to the narrow, 
contemporary sense of government as the executive branch of the 
state.
(11) Compare the 1981 outline (Résumé , p. 135-6) with the 
"Subject and Power" essay, p. 208.
(12) Compare the 'Intended Preface' to the History o f Sexuality 
in Foucault Reader , p.338, with the published 'Introduction' to 
L'Usage des plaisirs.
(13) See Wilhelm Hennis, Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction 
(London, Allen & Unwin, 1988).
(14) See, for e.g., 'The ethic of care for the self as a practice of 
freedom", p.19; 'Technologies of the Self, in Luther H. Martin et al 
(eds), Technologies o f the Self (London, Tavistock, 1988), p.19; 
and the sixth lecture of 1982.
(15) A recurrent fact about Foucault's lectures given in the 
second half of the 1970s is the gap between the titles and the 
actual topics; especially the continuous reference to bio-power in 
the title, and the failure to deliver, first in 1978, and then in 1979 
and in 1980. See Résumé.
(16) This does not mean a complete discrediting of the former 
concept, only a specification, limitation of its validity. In one of his 
1978 (?) lectures, when exercising an instance of self-criticism, 
Foucault made the following aside: "I am never completely wrong, 
but the point was not exactly that".
(17) See for e.g. Kritzman (ed), 250.
(18) This is the central contention of the work of Hennis on 
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(19) See the links established between Nietzsche and Foucault as 
philosophers of power (this is a commonplace in the secondary 
literature), between Weber and Foucault as the students of 
bureaucratic-disciplinary control (for e.g. O'Neill, 'The disciplinary 
society: from Weber to Foucault', in The British Journal of 
Sociology 37 (1985), 1:42-60); and Elias and Foucault as students 
of the repressive aspects of the civilising process (Robert van 
Krieken, 'The organization of the soul: Elias and Foucault on 
discipline and the self, in Archives Européennes de Sociologie 31 
(1990), 2: 353-71).
(19b) See Stefan Rossbach, 'The Author's Care of Himself On 
Nietzsche, Foucault, and Luhmann', seminar paper, 1992.
(20) Just think how meaningless would it be to ponder upon 
Marx's problem!
(21) See the Archeology of Knowledge ; the materials published 
by Eribon about Foucault's admission to the Collège de France, in 
the 2nd edition of his Michel Foucault (Paris, Flammarion, 1991) - 
the recent English translation, unfortunately, follows the first 
edition and omits these Appendices ; several interviews in eluded 
in the Power/Knowledge collection, see for e.g. pp. 109-13,183-7, 
and 198-99; 'A Conversation with Michel Foucault', in Partisan 
Review 33 (1971), 2:201; 'Michel Foucault on Attica: An 
Interview’, in Telos (1972), 19: 156; and especially the 
formulation in an 1975 interview published in English as 'An 
Interview with Michel Foucault' in History of the Present (1985), 
1:3: "It is the constraint that interests me".
(22) Published in English as "(Auto)biography', in History o f the 
Present, 1988, no.4.
(23) Résumé, 134-6; 'The Subject and Power', 208; 'Sexuality and 
Solitude’, p.4; Technologies o f the Self , pp.17-19.
(24) See the related references in note 21.
(25) See especially the Gay Science and the Will to Power. For an 
excellent commentary on Nietzsche of much relevance here, see 
Mark Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought (Cambridge, MIT 
Press, 1988).
(26) See L'ordre de discourse and the 1971 course outline; and 
contrast them to the 1972 course outline.
(27) Eribon’s book contains several telling examples. For example, 
nobody even heard of the Birth of the Clinic until he delivered the 
final manuscript to the publishers, (p.178, English ed. p.152)
(28) One only has to compare the 1964 "Nietzsche, Marx, Freud" 
essay with the Order o f Things ; also, the way that while before 
1965 and after 1969, he lists Dumézil, Canguilhem, and Hyppolite 
as his major sources of inspiration in his formative years, around 
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(29) This is especially evident in a 1966 interview, published in 
La Quinzaine Littéraire (May 16 1966), 5:14-15. In general, 
whenever we catch Foucault talking in the name of a "we"; this is 
a sure sign that something was wrong around him at that time.
For another telling example, in an 1973 lecture given in Brasil, 
recently published in German, where Foucault is talking as a "we" 
in the company of Deleuze, Guattari, and Lyotard. See 'Kônig 
Odipus: Der Mann, der zuviel wusste', in Lettre International 
(1989), 5: 68.
(30) See 'Politics and the Study of Discourse', in The Foucault 
Effect.
(31) In this type of analysis, it is not relevant whether Foucault 
was or was not conscious about these changes. It does not make a 
difference for the reconstruction.
(32) See 'Truth, Power, Self, in Technologies o f the Self , p. 13.
(33) See Eribon, p. 252. (English version p. 238).
(34) See the differences between the original projects for the 
prison-book, as given by the lecture outlines and interviews, and 
the final outcome.
(35) One direct proof that at that period he was aware of the new 
break is given by an interview givrn in 1980, where he spoke 
about the need for anonymity, wishing to have his new works 
being heard, without associating them to the previous ones. This 
was repeated in 1984, around the publication of the two new 
volumes. See Kritzman (ed), p.325, and p.53.
(36) See especially the introductory comments of the first lecture 
given in 1976.
(37) See, for e.g., the 'Introduction' to L'Usage des plaisirs ; or the 
chapter on the culture of the self in Le Souci de soi that contains a 
few hints of the topic of conversion, that played a central part in 
Foucault’s lectures both in 1980 and 1982. Some other topics, like 
baptism, and the link between initiation rituals and techniques of 
self, are completely missing even from the published outlines.
(38) Both of these remarks can be found in the Introduction to 
L'Usage des plaisirs , but difficult to make sense of without some 
acquaintance with the actual trajectory.
(39) The first is the preference of Kant over Nietzsche, due 
perhaps to the unfortunate association between Nietzsche and his 
work of the 1970s, and his perceived need to become "more 
respectable" in the 1980s; the second is the recurrent comparison 
between his work and the Frankfurt school, especially frequent at 
the time of the planned meeting with Habermas.
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(41) Or whatever words can be used here. These are misleading, 
as it was exactly "politics" and "society" that were discovered as 
answers to this problem, in different periods.
(42) This made it possible that later, even completely different 
"real" problems became subordinated to these solutions on the 
order of thought- Let's just refer to the history of the idea of "just 
war", its progress from utopia to a sanctioned practice.
(43) This became the title of his chair in 1970, and was the way 
he defined his own work in the three major published reviews of 
his work published in the 1980s: the '(Auto)biography', the 
'Intended Preface', and the 'Introduction'. For an excellent analysis 
of this and related points, see Maite Larrauri, 'La performativité 
linguistique au sein des expériences de la pensée', 1992, mimeo.
(44) See Résumé, 145-7, and Technologies o f the Self , p. 20-21.
(45) See especially the Genealogy of Morals, Preface, section 6. 
This section strangely is not referred to in Foucault's well-known 
essay on Nietzsche's genealogy.
(45b) If, following Staniszkis, we identify the former communist 
party with the absolutist monarch, this also gives hints about 
studying the current East European changes. See Jadviga 
Staniszkis, The Dynamics o f Breakthrough in Eastern Europe, 
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991).
(46) In most of the interviews he gave in 1983-84, he 
complained about how bored he became with sexuality. See for 
e.g. Foucault Reader, 340.
(47) Perhaps the best example is how the most influential 
thinkers of our period have been all led astray both in their 
predictions and preferences, much more than their more down-to- 
earth contemporaries, in most cases lending indirect or even 
direct support to the totalitarian tendencies of the 20th century, 
be it fascism, communism, or corporatism. The list is remarkable, 
including Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Weber, Durkheim, Pareto, 
Heidegger, Lukâcs, Sartre - and the names could be continued. It 
no doubt has a large role in the current return to the most boring 
platitudes of liberalism.
(48) Only a few hints appeared in print, and even these make 
much more sense once the lectures are consulted. See Foucault 
Reader, pp. 371-2.
(49) The point obviously is not to deny the value of professional 
knowledge, but to assign its proper place in a universe of 
knowledge bigger than itself.
(50) See Husserl for the first, or some recent and influential 
schools of economics for the second.
(51) One of the reasons why Foucault may have been hostile for a 
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Nietzsche, he identified reflexivity with reactive thought and the 
search for the deep truths of the self.
(52) See Moses I. Finley, Politics in the Ancient World 
(Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 53.
(53) Two examples can be given how Foucault was still hesitating 
about this issue. First, the Kant essay is generally considered as an 
affirmation of the tradition of the Enlightenment. Yet, in a 
discarded version, preserved in the Foucault Archives, Foucault is 
using the term "genealogy" to the Enlightenment (see D 250 (16), 
p.2). The second example is from the concluding methodological 
comments of the 1983 Berkeley lectures, where he stated that his 
aim was "to construct a genealogy of the critical attitude in 
Western philosophy." (see 'On Problématisation', in History o f the 
Present (1988), 4: 16.
(54) About this, see the recent work of Alessandro Pizzorno.
(55) What constitutes the difference between the real politeia 
and the philosopher's ideal was exactly the central theme of 
Plato's political work; (civic) education.
(56) The Alcibiades gives back the perplexity of contemporaries 
faced with the need to make a distinction between birth and 
education. This point, by the way, also helps to come to terms with 
the way Heidegger took the worst of Nietzsche, in terms of a wish 
to return to order in the traditional, pre-Socratic sense.
(57) This also helps to explain the co-existence of the crisis and 
dissolution of "disciplinary societies" with the emergence of "new 
tribalism", wishes of a return to pre-disciplinary order, that are 
again immediately belied by the way they use the worst kinds of 
the very disciplinary' techniques to further their purpose. In spite 
of the emergence differences in reality, in this sense there are 
analysable, crucial common points between recent developments 
in Bosnia and the American university system (for the latter, see 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Disuniting o f America (N.Y., Norton, 
1992)). Let's also remark here that this question of the dissolution 
of order is quite different from the question of the collapse of 
"traditional communities". Apart from analytical differences, the 
letter concept gives a kind of emotional evaluation, completely 
missing from the problem of order, as presented here.
For a number of comments made on an earlier version of this 
paper that helped a lot in making certain points - hopefully - 
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